AF-SOOMAALI

The Purge # 3 : HOW SO­MA­LI­A’S AL SHABAAB TURNED AGAINST ITS OWN FOR­EIGN FIGHT­ERS


AS THE SO­MALI LEAD­ERS of al Shabaab have moved to re­assert their au­thor­ity, al Qaeda, along with the for­eign fight­ers, has found it­self mar­gin­al­ized.

Osama bin Laden had al­ways wanted to es­tab­lish a foothold in So­ma­lia for al Qaeda. But the coun­try’s clan-based sys­tem made that very dif­fi­cult. The Ethiopian in­va­sion and U.S. killing cam­paign had changed that. Bin Laden named Mo­hammed Fazul, a Co­moros-born al Qaeda op­er­a­tive, as a head of al Qaeda in East Africa with a ma­jor di­rec­tive to sup­port the ji­had in So­ma­lia. Fazul was one of the mas­ter­minds of the 1998 U.S. Em­bassy bomb­ings in Kenya and Tan­za­nia and had or­ga­nized a se­ries of at­tacks against West­ern tar­gets in Kenya in 2002.

Ab­di­rah­man “Aynte” Ali, a lead­ing scholar on al Shabaab, told me that Fazul served as “the bridge be­tween al Shabaab and al Qaeda, tap­ping into the re­sources of al Qaeda, bring­ing in more for­eign fight­ers, as well as fi­nan­cial re­sources — more im­por­tantly, mil­i­tary know-how: how to make ex­plo­sives, how to train peo­ple, and so on. So that’s when they have gained the biggest in­flu­ence that they needed.”

In Au­gust 2010, al Shabaab de­clared what it called a “mas­sive war” against AMI­SOM troops, which at the time num­bered some 6,000. They hit con­voys, de­ployed sui­cide bombers and at­tacked gov­ern­ment min­is­ters, sow­ing fear and ter­ror and seiz­ing some ter­ri­tory in Mo­gadishu. The U.S. and other West­ern na­tions be­gan beef­ing up sup­port of the be­sieged peace­keep­ing force, which led to an over­whelm­ing of­fen­sive — com­plete with in­dis­crim­i­nate shelling of Shabaab po­si­tions — and ul­ti­mately forced Shabaab into what the group tried to char­ac­ter­ize as a strate­gic re­treat. Shabaab had taken heavy losses, and its lead­ers be­gan to bicker over the group’s next steps.

By 2011, Fazul Ab­dul­lah Mo­hammed’s world had grown very small. Al­most all of his East African al Qaeda com­rades had been as­sas­si­nated by JSOC, and he lived life on the run. He had a $5 mil­lion bounty on his head, cour­tesy of the U.S. gov­ern­ment. Some in­tel­li­gence re­ports in­di­cated that he may have had plas­tic surgery, and there were pe­ri­odic re­ports of him pop­ping up through­out the Horn of Africa us­ing aliases and fake pass­ports. With many of the vet­eran al Qaeda lead­ers gone, Fazul was in­creas­ingly iso­lated and deal­ing with the com­plex­i­ties of So­ma­li­a’s clan pol­i­tics. Then, on May 2, Osama bin Laden was killed.

Fazul was find­ing it more and more dif­fi­cult to de­liver ad­e­quate re­sources from al Qaeda to al Shabaab, and al Shabaab sought out dif­fer­ent means of fi­nanc­ing and sup­port, in­clud­ing mak­ing deals with pow­er­ful clans.

So Fazul found him­self at odds with al Shabaab’s So­mali lead­er­ship. I in­ter­viewed a So­mali in­tel­li­gence source who was given ac­cess to some of Fazul’s writ­ings seized by his agency in 2011. They de­scribed grow­ing “fis­sures,” re­veal­ing that “Fazul thought, es­sen­tially, that al Shabaab is go­ing the wrong way, that the tra­di­tional war­fare that’s go­ing on be­tween al Shabaab and the gov­ern­ment was not sus­tain­able any­more.” Fazul al­leged that al Shabaab was re­cruit­ing young peo­ple, but then “in a few months they’re just send­ing them as sui­cide bombers. And he thought that was such a bad idea, and that in the long run it would just erode fight­ers out of al Shabaab.” The source added: “I mean this guy’s look­ing way ahead, and he’s ac­cus­ing the al Shabaab lead­er­ship of be­ing short­sighted.”

On June 7, 2011, So­mali in­tel­li­gence op­er­a­tives in­formed the CIA that Fazul had been killed by some lo­cal mili­ti­a­men in So­ma­lia. Fazul, they said, had taken a wrong turn, had an al­ter­ca­tion with the sol­diers at a check­point and was gunned down. The Amer­i­cans, the So­mali in­tel­li­gence of­fi­cial told me, were “un­be­liev­ably grate­ful.” Then-Sec­re­tary of State Hillary Clin­ton called Fazul’s death “a sig­nif­i­cant blow to Al Qaeda, its ex­trem­ist al­lies and its op­er­a­tions in East Africa. It is a just end for a ter­ror­ist who brought so much death and pain to so many in­no­cents.”

Nei­ther Ibrahim nor the source with close ties to al Shabaab in­ter­viewed for this story be­lieve the of­fi­cial ver­sion of events in Fazul’s death. They sus­pect that Fazul was as­sas­si­nated, not by mili­ti­a­men or by the CIA, but rather by al Shabaab. “At that time, the for­mer leader of al Shabaab, Abu Zubayr, and Fazul, they kind of had some kind of clash,” says Ibrahim. “I’ll be killed by Shabaab soon. If I am killed, don’t waste my blood,” Ibrahim says Fazul told a se­nior So­mali Shabaab leader who sup­ported the for­eign fight­ers. “The con­flict con­tin­ued un­til this as­sas­si­na­tion hap­pened. I think al Shabaab planned that as­sas­si­na­tion. I don’t think it was a mis­take. I think it was set up,” says Ibrahim.

IN THE MONTHS af­ter Fazul’s death, the fis­sure be­tween the lo­cal Shabaab lead­er­ship and the for­eign fight­ers widened. Omar Ham­mami be­gan openly crit­i­ciz­ing the Shabaab lead­er­ship’s tac­tics and de­ci­sions. “He never ac­cepted any kind of hu­mil­i­a­tion and dis­re­spect, and ba­si­cally he stood up for his rights,” says Ibrahim.

The source with close ties to al Shabaab told me that dur­ing Ham­mami’s con­flict with Shabaab’s lead­er­ship, Ham­mami would, at times, walk around with a sui­cide vest on. The mes­sage: if you try to kill me, you will go down with me.

Ham­mami and other lead­ing for­eign fight­ers forged an al­liance with Mukhtar Robow, a long­time se­nior mem­ber of Shabaab. That’s when the in­ter­nal civil war for con­trol of Shabaab ex­ploded. Shabaab be­gan an as­sas­si­na­tion cam­paign against promi­nent for­eign fight­ers and their So­mali al­lies, sev­eral of whom were wanted by the U.S. or des­ig­nated for kill or cap­ture by the CIA. In June 2013, they killed Sheikh Moalim Burhan and Ibrahim Afghani, a So­mali who had lived in the U.S. in the 1980s. “Those guys some­how they wanted to start some kind of small rev­o­lu­tion, and some kind of up­ris­ing. They tried to speak pub­licly,” says Ibrahim. “They took them out in Barawe, killed them both.”

Robow, who also had a $5 mil­lion bounty is­sued by the U.S., and an­other Shabaab leader pub­licly de­nounced Shabaab’s chief, Abu Zubayr. Robow ac­cused the Shabaab leader of or­der­ing the killings of top for­eign fight­ers and of plot­ting to kill Ham­mami, call­ing it “a big crime against the blood of our broth­ers.”

That month, Robow fled Shabaab-con­trolled ter­ri­tory and re­turned to the safety of his fam­i­ly’s strong­hold. “He felt like he was­n’t safe, so he ran away to Bakool, where his fam­ily stayed and he’s un­der pro­tec­tion by his clan now,” says Ibrahim.

When Robow left, Ham­mami lost his most pow­er­ful pro­tec­tor. He be­gan live-tweet­ing Shabaab’s at­tempts to kill him, at one point post­ing a pic­ture of what he claimed was a wound from a would-be as­sas­s­in’s bul­let that had grazed his neck. “Just been shot in neck by shabab as­sas­sin. not crit­i­cal yet,” Ham­mami tweeted in April 2013. Later he al­leged that Shabaab was send­ing in as­sas­sins from var­i­ous di­rec­tions: “abu zubayr has gone mad. he’s start­ing a civil war,” he tweeted.

Even­tu­ally, on Sep­tem­ber 12, 2013, Ham­mami was killed. Long sought by the U.S. gov­ern­ment, his killers were not from the CIA or JSOC, but al Shabaab.

“The for­eign fight­ers made [Shabaab] go for­ward. And one of them was Abu Man­sour al Am­riki [Ham­mami]. He played a big role, he was a very smart guy, he im­proved a lot of things,” re­calls Ibrahim. “He made Shabaab be more in­ter­na­tional. The Shabaab killed him, man. That’s clear cut be­cause the guy be­came a pub­lic threat.” Ham­mami was killed along­side his friend and fel­low for­eign fighter — a British cit­i­zen who went by the name Osama Pak­istani.

As Ibrahim watched Shabaab im­plode and wit­nessed his fel­low for­eign fight­ers im­pris­oned or as­sas­si­nated, sus­pi­cions that had lin­gered in the back of his mind be­gan to dom­i­nate his thoughts. He re­al­ized he had made a life-al­ter­ing and po­ten­tially life-end­ing mis­take in com­ing to So­ma­lia. The story could end, not with his dy­ing in ji­had, but in be­ing killed or im­pris­oned by his for­mer al­lies from al Shabaab.

Some of Ibrahim’s col­leagues have been killed, while oth­ers have dis­ap­peared in se­cret pris­ons run by Shabaab. Their im­pris­on­ment is of­ten pre­ceded by an al­le­ga­tion of spy­ing or con­spir­ing against the Shabaab lead­er­ship. “They had se­cret pris­ons be­fore, but the se­cret pris­ons be­came more ef­fec­tive af­ter the killings of Abu Man­sour al Am­riki and Sheikh Burhan and all those guys,” he says. “Who­ever goes against Shabaab, says any­thing they don’t like, they will be seen as an en­emy to the Shabaab and some­how they will hit you [be­cause] you are not serv­ing their in­ter­est. You’ll see your­self miss­ing, in an un­der­ground prison be­ing tor­tured.”

What kind of tor­ture?

“Beat­ings, wa­ter­board­ing, they used some kind of gas. They tie you up for hours and hours. Lack of food, lack of sleep. You might be whipped out­side, night­time. You might be cru­ci­fied, tied to a car. Tied to the back of an SUV [that they] then drive. All these types of things.”

Most of the peo­ple in the pris­ons, Ibrahim says, are for­eign fight­ers, in­clud­ing, at pre­sent, at least two Amer­i­cans. “Most of the time what they do is they will cat­e­go­rize you as a spy and will have you locked up in an un­der­ground prison,” he says. “You know you might be serv­ing over a year and when you come out then you might have two op­tions: to keep quiet or oth­er­wise you’ll be de­ported.” De­ported, he says, means be­ing sent to a coun­try that would likely charge you as a ter­ror­ist for be­ing a mem­ber of al Shabaab, as the U.S. has done re­peat­edly.

It could also mean be­ing dumped on the streets of Mo­gadishu. The So­mali gov­ern­ment has started an amnesty pro­gram for So­ma­lis who leave al Shabaab. If they turn them­selves in, they will have their free­dom. But it comes with the risk of as­sas­si­na­tion by Shabaab.