AF-SOOMAALI

The Purge # 2 : HOW SO­MA­LI­A’S AL SHABAAB TURNED AGAINST ITS OWN FOR­EIGN FIGHT­ERS


SOON AF­TER JOIN­ING al Shabaab, Ibrahim met the most fa­mous Amer­i­can fighter in So­mali his­tory — a young U.S. cit­i­zen from Al­abama, Omar Ham­mami, known in So­ma­lia as Abu Man­sour al Am­riki. “He was a happy, young guy — typ­i­cal West­ern,” Ibrahim re­calls.

Ibrahim viewed Ham­mami as a men­tor and a leader within the con­tin­gent of for­eign fight­ers. Ham­mami had trav­eled to So­ma­lia in 2006 and joined fight­ers from the Is­lamic Courts Union as they bat­tled a U.S.-backed Ethiopian in­va­sion of the coun­try. The ICU, a pop­ulist coali­tion that ex­pelled CIA-backed war­lords from Mo­gadishu in the sum­mer of 2006, sought to cre­ate a gov­ern­ment based on Shariah law. But the ICU’s time in power would be short lived. U.S. and Ethiopian troops be­gan as­sas­si­nat­ing and im­pris­on­ing its lead­ers, and Ethiopian troops oc­cu­pied Mo­gadishu and other ar­eas of So­ma­lia for two years.

As the Is­lamic Courts dis­in­te­grated, al Shabaab emerged as the only re­main­ing re­sis­tance force against for­eign oc­cu­pa­tion. Overnight, the group went from be­ing a small part of the Is­lamic move­ment to “lib­er­ate” So­ma­lia to the van­guard of that strug­gle. It so­lid­i­fied its af­fil­i­a­tion with al Qaeda and be­gan ag­gres­sively re­cruit­ing for­eign fight­ers. Al Qaeda, mean­while, saw po­ten­tial in So­ma­lia as a fu­ture base of op­er­a­tions.

In early Jan­u­ary 2007, bin Laden’s deputy, Ay­man al Za­wahiri, ad­dressed the sit­u­a­tion in So­ma­lia in a record­ing re­leased on­line. “I speak to you to­day as the cru­sader in­vader forces of Ethiopia vi­o­late the soil of the beloved Mus­lim So­ma­lia,” he be­gan. “I call upon the Mus­lim na­tion in So­ma­lia to re­main in the new bat­tle­field that is one of the cru­sader bat­tle­fields that are be­ing launched by Amer­ica and its al­lies and the United Na­tions against Is­lam and Mus­lims.” He im­plored the mu­ja­hedeen, “Launch am­bushes, land mines, raids and sui­ci­dal com­bats un­til you con­sume them as the li­ons eat their prey.”

Ham­mami had won street cred­i­bil­ity within al Shabaab for be­ing among the first to an­swer that call. He was there dur­ing a pe­riod of leg­endary bat­tles, had a So­mali wife and quickly be­came the prized Eng­lish-speak­ing am­bas­sador for Shabaab’s ef­fort to at­tract West­ern youth. He would post YouTube videos de­scrib­ing the joys of the ji­had and the com­fort of an Is­lamic lifestyle. He even pro­duced hip-hop songs pre­dict­ing his demise by a drone strike or cruise mis­sile. “He was a kind of sym­bol for the for­eign fight­ers — he was here since the end of 2006 and he fought in a lot of bat­tles and he was well ed­u­cated. He was very smart,” says Ibrahim.

In late 2007, a year af­ter he first ar­rived in So­ma­lia, Ham­mami ap­peared on Al Jazeera — with a kef­fiyeh cov­er­ing much of his face — ex­plain­ing why he had joined al Shabaab. “Oh, Mus­lims of Amer­ica, take into con­sid­er­a­tion the sit­u­a­tion in So­ma­lia,” he de­clared. “Af­ter 15 years of chaos and op­pres­sive rule by the Amer­i­can-backed war­lords, your broth­ers stood up and es­tab­lished peace and jus­tice in this land.” By that point, So­mali of­fi­cials es­ti­mated that more than 450 for­eign fight­ers had come to So­ma­lia to join al Shabaab in its strug­gle.

Fol­low­ing Ham­mami’s lead, af­ter re­ceiv­ing ba­sic train­ing from Shabaab, Ibrahim be­gan to en­gage in reg­u­lar at­tacks against AMI­SOM troops — mostly from Uganda and Bu­rundi. “I took part in a lot of bat­tles, mostly within Mo­gadishu. I don’t think any bat­tles had a name,” he re­calls. “When I came, I stayed with for­eign fight­ers known as muha­jireen.” He said there were fight­ers from the United States, Canada, the U.K., Den­mark, Su­dan, Saudi Ara­bia and East African coun­tries.

Soon, how­ever, pow­er­ful So­mali lead­ers of al Shabaab came to see the flood of for­eign fight­ers as a threat to their own fief­doms. By 2011, a rift had emerged within the group — one that would pit the for­eign fight­ers against the So­mali lead­er­ship in bloody con­flict, and would ul­ti­mately lead Ibrahim to re­gret com­ing to So­ma­lia to join Shabaab.

 

TO BE CON­TIN­UED…………..NEXT WEEK