AF-SOOMAALI

His­tory learned # 3 : The Great China Pro­ject


Post intervention civil war, pre UIC (1995-2005)

Since then, the civil war has con­tin­ued un­abated. The smaller north­ern pop­u­la­tions in So­ma­liland and Punt­land have en­joyed rel­a­tive sta­bil­ity, while else­where fac­tions, mili­tias and war­lords have strug­gled to con­trol ter­ri­tory, peo­ple and re­sources. UN and re­gional ef­forts to achieve cease­fires re­peat­edly failed; at­tempts to form tem­po­rary gov­ern­ments re­peat­edly failed; at­tempts to achieve peace re­peat­edly failed. Out­side So­ma­liland and Punt­land, the rest of the coun­try, in par­tic­u­lar the cap­i­tal Mo­gadishu, re­mained with­out any ef­fec­tive gov­ern­ment.

The abil­ity of So­ma­lis to sur­vive in Mo­gadishu un­der con­di­tions of wide­spread bru­tal­ity and vi­o­lence tes­ti­fies to their re­silience. To cross from one war­lord’s re­gion into an­other in­volved ma­jor risk; some­times even to leave one’s house en­tailed ma­jor risk. Nev­er­the­less, many of the bazaars and mar­kets con­tin­ued to func­tion. Life goes on.[4]

An­ar­cho-cap­i­tal­ists re­gard the sit­u­a­tion in Mo­gadishu as hope­ful, point­ing the way, they say, to an ap­par­ently utopian model of a cap­i­tal­ist eco­nomic sys­tem with­out a state. As ev­i­dence they cite the bet­ter func­tion­ing of the telecom­mu­ni­ca­tions sys­tem than some nearby coun­tries (So­ma­lia has 15 tele­phones per 1000 peo­ple, rather than 10 as in neigh­bor­ing coun­tries). Never mind that the net­work is op­er­ated in con­junc­tion with ma­jor multi­na­tional cor­po­ra­tions such as Sprint and Te­lenor, that the sys­tem was es­tab­lished with the help of the UN and the In­ter­na­tional Telecom­mu­ni­ca­tions Union, and that the So­mali Tele­com As­so­ci­a­tion is head­quar­tered out­side the coun­try in Dubai. They cite pri­vate pro­vi­sion of wa­ter ac­cess. Never mind that many fam­i­lies are now in debt for wa­ter, and that no mar­ket in­cen­tive or reg­u­la­tory oblig­a­tion has con­vinced those pri­vate op­er­a­tors to pu­rify their wa­ter: ac­cess to safe wa­ter is low even by African stan­dards. They also cite air travel op­er­a­tion with­out any gov­ern­ment reg­u­la­tion. Never mind that other coun­tries are re­lied upon to main­tain air­craft, and that So­mali air­ports op­er­ate with­out trained air­craft con­trollers, fire crews, run­way lights, or even fences to keep out stray an­i­mals. Per­haps there’s an an­ar­cho-cap­i­tal­ist utopia, but So­ma­lia is not the model.[5]

We may ad­mire the har­di­ness of So­ma­lis and their abil­ity to con­tinue life, in many re­spects as nor­mal, un­der such ad­verse cir­cum­stances. They have con­tin­ued with tra­di­tional in­sti­tu­tions and sys­tems, which help to main­tain so­cial co­he­sion. They have en­dured the rav­ings, the egos, the bul­ly­ing and the bru­tal­ity of the war­lords; and as the war­lords have been ban­ished from ever larger parts of the coun­try by the Union of Is­lamic Courts, they have ap­plauded, if noth­ing else, their new­found abil­ity to go about their lives un­hin­dered.

The rise of the Union of Islamic Courts (2000-)

It may well seem like a mir­a­cle: in­deed, some have ex­plic­itly said so. The Union of Is­lamic Courts (UIC), ex­ist­ing in some form since 2000, only be­came a pow­er­ful po­lit­i­cal and mil­i­tary en­tity in early 2006. Ma­jor fight­ing was re­ported in March, and by June they had taken the cap­i­tal Mo­gadishu. The war­lords fled, and suf­fered de­feat upon de­feat. The Is­lamic Courts have swept all be­fore them – even Mo­gadishu garbage, which had­n’t been col­lected since 1991 – and are now fight­ing for the one re­main­ing town, Baidoa, seat of the tran­si­tional fed­eral gov­ern­ment (TFG), which is de­fended by Ethiopian planes, troops and ar­tillery, and backed diplo­mat­i­cally and fi­nan­cially by the US and UN.

As al­ready men­tioned, the UIC is some­what un­usual, com­pared to other fac­tions in the civil war. Af­ter the col­lapse of gov­ern­ment in 1991, aided by busi­ness­men de­sir­ing an or­derly com­mer­cial en­vi­ron­ment, Sharia courts be­came the main ju­di­cial sys­tem, and evolved to pro­vide ed­u­ca­tion, health care and po­lice ser­vices. They gained wide­spread pub­lic sup­port, and helped to re­duce rob­beries, drug-deal­ing and pros­ti­tu­tion. The mili­tias which en­forced their de­ci­sions evolved into the fight­ing force which has ef­fec­tively con­quered most of the coun­try. The af­fil­i­a­tion of the courts is some­what loose: each court makes its own de­ci­sions, and dif­fer­ent courts and judges ap­ply Sharia law in dif­fer­ent ways. So­ma­lia is a deeply Mus­lim na­tion, but has his­tor­i­cally prac­ticed a rel­a­tively mild form of Is­lam. The mem­ber­ship and lead­er­ship of the Courts both con­tain a spec­trum of Is­lamic thought, from lib­eral to Wah­habist. This no­table in­clu­sive­ness re­flects the fed­er­al­ist struc­ture of the UIC.

The UIC, through sup­port from lo­cal imams, has gained sig­nif­i­cant pop­u­lar le­git­i­macy. Cit­i­zens can be ex­pected to ap­pre­ci­ate the work of any or­ga­ni­za­tion which ends years of vi­o­lence and es­tab­lishes peace­ful so­cial re­la­tions. But it ap­pears that the uniquely re­li­gious, so­cial and ju­di­cial el­e­ments of the UIC have also helped them to gain sup­port, and to es­tab­lish al­liances with which to se­cure and con­sol­i­date power. The en­force­ment of con­ser­v­a­tive Is­lam may be­come re­pres­sive and un­pop­u­lar where it oc­curs, but at least for an ini­tial pe­riod, the UIC car­ries a sig­nif­i­cant amount of pub­lic good­will. They have brought peace over re­gions they con­trol, built schools and hos­pi­tals, cre­ated a form of jus­tice and a sta­ble busi­ness en­vi­ron­ment through their courts, and have emerged vic­to­ri­ous. Nu­mer­ous de­fec­tions of en­emy troops to the UIC have been re­ported through­out their ad­vances; they are cer­tainly seen as more le­git­i­mate than the war­lords in the TFG. Nonethe­less, their takeover of Mo­gadishu and the threat of full-scale war led to a stream of 18,000 refugees into Kenya by Au­gust.

On the other hand, the TFG may not have ever pos­sessed as much le­git­i­macy as its UN ap­proval might sug­gest. Of course, as the re­sult of an in­ter­na­tion­ally-bro­kered agree­ment be­tween ma­jor fac­tions, it cer­tainly has the po­ten­tial to be­come a le­git­i­mate na­tional gov­ern­ment. But quite apart from So­ma­l­is’ on­go­ing mis­trust of in­ter­na­tional in­sti­tu­tions, the TFG’s very na­ture erodes its le­git­i­macy. Be­ing a com­pro­mise of the phys­i­cally pow­er­ful, it in­cludes hated war­lords among its ranks, in­cor­po­rat­ing them into ma­jor min­is­te­r­ial posts. As the UIC took con­trol of Mo­gadishu, the mili­tias fight­ing against them were led by war­lords who were min­is­ters in the TFG, fight­ing in a ‘pri­vate’ ca­pac­ity. At least some those min­is­ters were ex­pelled from the TFG shortly af­ter­wards.

TO BE CON­TIN­UED………NEXT WEEK