Baidoa is not the Somali capital (Mogadishu), which was taken by the UIC in July. But it is the home of the UN-sponsored transitional federal government (TFG), formed in 2004 in Kenya. The transitional administration could never establish itself in Mogadishu, as the city suffered the turf wars and bloody violence of rival warlords. Indeed, many of the same warlords whose militias vied for control of Mogadishu were given high-level posts in the transitional administration, continuing to operate their militias privately in the capital. Mogadishu was too dangerous for the militarily weak transitional administration, and Baidoa was chosen as the temporary seat of government instead.
But now the Islamic courts are poised to take Baidoa. The transitional administration struggles to survive, with virtually no military force of its own, lacking authority anywhere else in the country, propped up by Ethiopian troops, and backed diplomatically by UN resolutions and US threats. The UN clings to the results of its diplomatic efforts, even as they are destroyed, along with their legitimacy, by facts on the ground.
Somalia is on a knife edge between two futures. At this critical time, a document has been leaked from the Somali transitional administration, via Chinese sources to WikiLeaks.Org. It is apparently a ‘secret decision’ signed by Aweys from November 2005 outlining tactics for the Islamic Courts movement. Is it credible? Many of the strategies it recommends have been pursued, but some of it sounds like a smear. Understanding its credibility requires some knowledge of Somali history and politics. But if it is authentic, then it is the first policy document of the Islamic courts, beyond public announcements, to make it into the hands of the international media. And whether the document is genuine or not, one is still forced to ask: How did Somalia find itself in this situation? How did the UN find itself in this situation? What is the Union of Islamic Courts, and how did they rise so fast in such a chaotic situation, where no others have succeeded? And what is likely to happen if they gain control of the country? What hope is there for Somalia’s future?
History
If ‘Somalia’ or ‘Mogadishu’ resonates in the Western mind, it’s probably due to the US propaganda movie ‘Black Hawk Down’, or news reports of the 1992-1995 UN-sanctioned US intervention.
That intervention was a domestic political disaster for the US. But it was an even larger disaster for Somalis. And larger again, because it follows the outcome of many previous colonial interventions.
Differing regions of Somalia have been ruled by British, French and Italian colonial powers. Somalis often fought as proxies for their imperial overlords. Their lands were split along arbitrary lines, with members of the same ethnic group finding themselves separated by imperial borders; as with much of the rest of Africa, they were fought over and treated as pawns in the African edition of “The Great Game”. Ethnic Somalis live in areas of the present-day countries of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti, as well as Somalia. The colonial situation persisted through World War II. Somalis were regularly lured and coerced into fratricide.
In 1950, five years after the end of World War II, the UN established a trust territory under Italian control. In 1960 the former British and Italian Somali colonies became independent as a united Somalia. The formerly British part is the north-western region known as Somaliland, and today operates as a de facto independent nation, though without any international recognition.
President Muhammad Said Barre (1969-1991)
From 1969 until 1991 the country was ruled by Muhammad Siad Barre, a Soviet- and then US-backed dictator. Barre established several social programmes, raised literacy and educational standards, improved infrastructure, and implemented capital works programmes. His regime was also brutally authoritarian, murdering thousands. It was corrupt and dependent on foreign aid, which was often diverted to projects of political largess and self-aggrandizement rather than social welfare. Barre engaged in a futile war with Ethiopia over the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, leading to tens of thousands of deaths. Somalis were subject to one of the worst African dictatorships.
Part of Barre’s success lay in his ability to unite the Somali clans. Somali society is clan-based and the clan always holds a Somali’s first political loyalty. Alliances are often expressed through clan affiliations and traditional clan institutions. The clan structure of society has helped people to endure the harshness of their climate and geography, even in the face of national government neglect or abuse. The cost of Barre’s clan support was an extensive network of allegiances maintained through largesse. The corruption inherent in that system led to a great disillusionment and cynicism towards the state amongst ordinary Somalis, reaffirming their relative trust in clan loyalties.
After the Barre Presidency (1991-1998)
Following Barre’s death, a struggle for power between rival militias threw the country into chaos. In 1991 the north-western region of Somaliland declared independence, and still considers itself an independent nation; it has a relatively stable democratic government, along Kurdish lines, though the country has no foreign recognition. In 1998 the northern region of Puntland declared autonomy, asserting that it will govern itself until Somalia has a functioning government, which it will then rejoin. Puntland and Somaliland have been spared much of the violence of the rest of the country; together they form a contiguous region which is approximately the northern third of Somalia.
UN-, US-led intervention (1992-1995)
Following the brutal murders of Pakistani UN troops by the militia of Somali warlord Mohamed Farrah Aidid, US-led UN forces soon abandoned neutrality and the mission, rather than establishing a stable, impartial, transitional order, became a war against Aidid. During a meeting of leaders and elders from Aidid’s clan, discussing a peace agreement with the UN, the US received “erroneous intelligence” that Aidid was planning attacks, and ordered that it be bombed. As respected leaders of Somali civil society discussed their future, that future was brought to an end. Fifty-four senior members of Somali society died. No apology was given; no US or UN military leader was brought to justice. Somalis united against the intervention forces. The ‘Black Hawk Down’ situation soon followed. None of these relevant facts make the Hollywood version. UN troops were withdrawn in short order, leaving Somali society further exposed. The US lost 18 soldiers. In the course of the ‘Black Hawk Down’ operation alone, the US estimates that 1000 to 1500 Somalis died, including both militia and civilians.
To those who believe in the essential benevolence of US power and foreign interventions – which includes the entire permissible spectrum of US political thought – the intervention in Somalia is the prime example of such benevolence. When critics point to some fairly dubious US interventions – Chile, Guatemala, Iran, Nicaragua, Panama, Iraq, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, the list goes on – the reply is, okay, but what about Somalia! No direct US interests there – what altruism! Critics wonder about the lucrative US oil exploration going on at the time. Paranoids! But then what are we to make of the US using oil company Conoco’s offices as a temporary embassy? The Somali intervention was supposed to be easy, painless (at least for US soldiers), and effective, returning functioning government swiftly to a region torn by strife. And perhaps it could have been.
TO BE CONTINUED………NEXT WEEK